Question VII. In Which Various Doubts are Set Forth with Regard to the Foregoing Questions and Negative Answers. Whether the Accused is to be Imprisoned, and when she is to be considered Manifestly Taken in the Foul Heresy of Witchcraft. This is the Second Action

It is asked first what is to be done when, as often happens, the accused denies everything. We answer that the Judge has three points to consider, namely, her bad reputation, the evidence of the fact, and the words of the witnesses; and he must see whether all these agree together. And if, as very often is the case, they do not altogether agree together, since witches are variously accused of different deeds committed in some village or town; but the evidences of the fact are visible to the eye, as that a child has been harmed by sorcery, or, more often, a beast has been bewitched or deprived of its milk; and it a number of witnesses have come forward whose evidence, even if it show certain discrepancies (as that one should say she had bewitched his child, another his beast, and a third should merely witness to her reputation, and so with the others), but nevertheless agree in the substance of the fact, that is, as to the witchcraft, and that she is suspected of being a witch; although those witnesses are not enough to warrant a conviction without the fact of the general report, or even with that fact, as was shown above at the end of Question III, yet, taken in conjunction with the visible and tangible evidence of the fact, the Judge may, in consideration of these three points together, decide that the accused is to be reputed, not as strongly or gravely under suspicion (which suspicions will be explained later), but as manifestly taken in the heresy of witchcraft; provided, that is, that the witnesses are of a suitable condition and have not given evidence out of enmity, and that a sufficient number of them, say six or eight or ten, have agreed together under oath. And then, according to the Canon Law, he must subject her to punishment, whether she has confessed her crime or not. And this is proved as follows.

For since it is said, that when all three of the above considerations are in agreement, then she should be thought to be manifestly taken in heresy, it must not be understood that it is necessary for all three to be in agreement, but only that if this is the case the proof is all the stronger. For either one instance by itself of the following two circumstances, namely, the evidence of the fact and the production of legitimate witnesses, is sufficient to cause a person to be reputed as manifestly taken in heresy; and all the more when both these considerations are in agreement.

For when the Jurists ask in how many ways a person may be considered as manifestly taken in heresy, we answer that there are three ways, as S. Bernard has explained. This matter was treated of above in the First Question at the beginning of this work, namely, the evidence of the fact, when a person has publicly preacher heresy. But here we consider the evidence of the fact provided by public threats uttered by the accused, as when she said, "You shall have no healthy days," or some such thing, and the threatened effect has followed. The other two ways are the legitimate proof of the case by witnesses, and thirdly by her own confession. Therefore, if each of these singly is sufficient to cause a person to be manifestly suspected, how much more is this the case when the reputation of the accused, the evidence of the fact, and the depositions of witnesses all together point to the same conclusion. It is true that S. Bernard speaks of an evident fact, and we here speak of the evidence of the fact; but this is because the devil does not work openly, but secretly. Therefore the injuries and the instruments of witchcraft which are found constitute the evidence of the fact. And whereas in other heresies an evident fact is alone sufficient, here we join three proofs together.

Secondly, it is thus proved that a person so taken is to be punished according to the law, even though she denies the accusation. For a person taken on the evidence of the fact, or on the depositions of witnesses, either confesses the crime or does not. If he confesses and is impenitent, he is to be handed over to the secular courts to suffer the extreme penalty, according to the chapter ad abolendam , or he is to be imprisoned for life, according to the chapter excommunicamus. But if he does not confess, and stoutly maintains his denial, he is to be delivered as an impenitent to the power of the Civil Court to be punished in a fitting manner, as Henry of Segusio shows in his Summa, where he treats of the manner of proceeding against heretics.

It is therefore concluded that it is most just if the Judge proceeds in that manner with his questions and the depositions of witnesses, since, as has been said, he can in a case concerning the Faith conduct matters quite plainly and in a short and summary manner; and it is meet that he should consign the accused to prison for a time, or for several years, in case perhaps, being depressed after a year of the squalor of prison, she may confess her crimes.

But, lest it should seem that he arrives at his sentence precipitately, and to show that he proceeds with all equity, let us inquire into what should next be done.

Question VIII. Which Follows from the Preceding Question, Whether the Witch is to be Imprisoned, and of the Method of Taking her. This is the Third Action of the Judge

It is asked whether, after she has denied the accusation, the witch ought to be kept in custody in prison, when the three aforesaid conditions, namely, her reputation, the evidence of the fact, and the depositions of witnesses, are in agreement; or whether she should be dismissed with the security of sureties, so that she may again be called and questioned. As to this question there are three opinions.

First, it is the opinion of some that she should be sent to prison, and that by no means ought she to be dismissed under bond; and they hold this opinion on the strength of the reasoning brought forward in the preceding question, namely, that she is to be considered as manifestly guilty when all those three considerations are in agreement.

Others, again, think that before she is imprisoned she may be dismissed with the safeguard of sureties; so that if she makes her escape, she can then be considered as convicted. But after she has been imprisoned because of her negative answers, she is not to be released under any safeguard or condition of bail, that is, when those three considerations noted above are in agreement; because in that case she could not subsequently be sentenced and punished by death; and this, they say, is the general custom.

The third opinion is that no definite rule can be given, but that it must be left to the Judge to act in accordance with the gravity of the matter as shown by the testimony of the witnesses, the reputation of the accused, and the evidence as to the fact, and the extent to which these three agree with each other; and that he should follow the custom of the country. And they who hold this opinion conclude by saying that if reputable and responsible sureties are not to be procured, and the accused is suspected of contemplating flight, she should then be cast into prison. And this third opinion seems to be the most reasonable, as long as the correct procedure if observed; and this consists in three things.

First, that her house should be searched as thoroughly as possible, in all holes and corners and chests, top and bottom; and if she is a noted witch, then without doubt, unless she has previously hidden them, there will be found various instruments of witchcraft, as we have shown above.

Secondly, if she has a maid-servant or companions, that she or they should be shut up by themselves; for though they are not accused, yet it is presumed that none of the accused's secrets are hidden from them.

Thirdly, in taking her, if she be taken in her own house, let her not be given time to go into her room; for they are wont to secure in this way, and bring away with them, some object or power of witchcraft which procures them the faculty of keeping silent under examination.

This gives rise to the question whether the method employed by some to capture a witch is lawful, namely, that she should be lifted from the ground by the officers, and carried out in a basket or on a plank of wood so that she cannot again touch the ground. This can be answered by the opinion of the Canonists and of certain Theologians, that this is lawful in three respects. First, because, as is shown in the introductory question of this Third Part, it is clear from the opinion of many authorities, and especially of such Doctors as no one would dare to dispute, as Duns Scotus, Henry of Segusio and Godfrey of Fontaines, that it is lawful to oppose vanity with vanity. Also we know from experience and the confessions of witches that when they are taken in this manner they more often lose the power of keeping silence under examination: indeed many who have been about to be burned have asked that they might be allowed at least to touch the ground with one foot; and when this has been asked why they made such a request, they have answered that if they had touched the ground they would have liberated themselves, striking many other people dead with lightning.

The second reason is this. It was manifestly shown in the Second Part of this work that a witch loses all her power when she falls into the hands of public justice, that is, with regard to the past; but with regard to the future, unless she receives from the devil fresh powers of keeping silent, she will confess all her crimes. Therefore let us say with S. Paul: Whatsoever we do in word or deed, let all be done in the name of the Lord JESUS Christ. And if the witch be innocent, this form of capture will not harm her.

Thirdly, according to the Doctors it is lawful to counteract witchcraft by vain means; for they all agree as to this, though they are at variance over the question as to when those vain means may also be unlawful. Therefore when Henry of Segusio says that it is lawful to oppose vanity with vanity, this is explained as meaning that he speaks of vain means, not of unlawful means. All the more, then, is it lawful to obstruct witchcraft; and it is this obstruction which is referred to here, and not any unlawful practice.

Let the Judge note also that there are two sorts of imprisonment; one being a punishment inflicted upon criminals, but the other only a matter of custody in the house of detention. And these two sorts are noted in the chapter multorum querela; therefore she ought at least to be placed in custody. But if it is only a slight matter of which she is accused, and she is not of bad reputation, and there is no evidence of her work upon children or animals, then she may be sent back to her house. But because she has certainly associated with witches and knows their secrets, she must give sureties; and if she cannot do so, she must be bound by oaths and penalties not to go out of her house unless she is summoned. But her servants and domestics, of whom we spoke above, must be kept in custody, yet not punished.

Question IX. What is to be done after the Arrest, and whether the Names of the Witnesses should be made Known to the Accused. This is the Fourth Action

THERE are two matters to be attended to after the arrest, but it is left to the Judge which shall be taken first; namely, the question of allowing the accused to be defended, and whether she should be examined in the place of torture, though not necessarily in order that she should be tortured. The first is only allowed when a direct request is made; the second only when her servants and companions, if she has any, have first been examined in the house.

But let us proceed in the order as above. If the accused says that she is innocent and falsely accused, and that she wishes to see and hear her accusers, then it is a sign that she is asking to defend herself. But it is an open question whether the Judge is bound to make the deponents known to her and bring them to confront her face to face. For here let the Judge take note that he is not bound either to publish the names of the deponents or to bring them before the accused, unless they themselves should freely and willingly offer to come before the accused and lay their depositions in her presence And it is by reason of the danger incurred by the deponents that the Judge is not bound to do this. For although different Popes have had different opinions on this matter, none of them has ever said that in such a case the Judge is bound to make known to the accused the names of the informers or accusers (but here we are not dealing with the case of an accuser). On the contrary, some have thought that in no case ought he to do so, while others have thought that he should in certain circumstances.

But, finally, Bonifice VIII decreed as follows: If in a case of heresy it appear to the Bishop or Inquisitor that grave danger would be incurred by the witnesses of informers on account of the powers of the persons against whom they lay their depositions, should their names be published, he shall not publish them. But if there is no danger, their names shall be published just as in other cases.

Here it is to be noted that this refers not only to a Bishop or Inquisitor, but to any Judge conducting a case against witches with the consent of the Inquisitor or Bishop; for, as was shown in the introductory Question, they can depute their duties to a Judge. So that any such Judge, even if he be secular, has the authority of the Pope, and not only of the Emperor.

Also a careful Judge will take notice of the powers of the accused persons; for these are of three kinds, namely, the power of birth and family, the power of riches, and the power of malice. And the last of these is more to be feared than the other two, since it threatens more danger to the witnesses if their names are made known to the accused. The reason for this is that it is more dangerous to make known the names of the witnesses to an accused person who is poor, because such a person has many evil accomplices, such as outlaws and homicides, associated with him, who venture nothing but their own persons, which is not the case with anyone who is nobly born or rich, and abounding in temporal possessions. And the kind of danger which is to be feared is explained by Pope John XXII as the death of cutting off of themselves or their children or kindred, or the wasting of their substance, or some such matter.

Further, let the Judge take notice that, as he acts in this matter with the authority of the Supreme Pontiff and the permission of the Ordinary, both he himself and all who are associated with him at the depositions, or afterwards at the pronouncing of the sentence, must keep the names of the witnesses secret, under pain of excommunication. And it is in the power of the Bishop thus to punish him or them if they do otherwise. Therefore he should very implicitly warn them not to reveal the name from the very beginning of the process.

Wherefore the above decrees of Pope Bonifice VIII goes on to say: And that the danger to those accusers and witnesses may be the more effectively met, and the inquiry conducted more cautiously, we permit, by the authority of this statute, that the Bishop or Inquisitors (or, as we have said, the Judge) shall forbid all those who are concerned in the inquiry to reveal without their permission any secrets which they have learned from the Bishop or Inquisitors, under pain of excommunication, which they may incur by violating such secrets.

It is further to be noted that just as it is a punishable offence to publish the names of witnesses indiscreetly, so also it is to conceal them without good reason from, for instance, such people as have a right to know them, such as the lawyers and assessors whose opinion is to be sought in proceeding to the sentence; in the same way the names must not be concealed when it is possible to publish them without risk of any danger to the witnesses. On this subject the above decree speaks as follows, towards the end: We command that in all cases the Bishop or Inquisitors shall take especial care not to suppress the names of the witnesses as if there were danger to them when there is perfect security, not conversely to decide to publish them when there is some danger threatened, the decision in this matter resting with their own conscience and discretion. And it has been written in comment on these words: Whoever you are who are a Judge in such a case, mark those words well, for they do not refer to a slight risk but to a grave danger; therefore do not deprive a prisoner of his legal rights without very good cause, for this cannot but be an offence to Almighty God.

The reader must note that all the process which we have already described, and all that we have yet to describe, up to the methods of passing sentence (except the death sentence), which it is in the province of the ecclesiastical Judge to conduct, can also, with the consent of the Diocesans, be conducted by a secular Judge. Therefore the reader need find no difficulty in the fact that the above Decree speaks of an ecclesiastical and not a secular Judge; for the latter can take his method of inflicting the death sentence from that of the Ordinary in passing sentence of penance.

Question X. What Kind of Defence may be Allowed, and of the Appointment of an Advocate. This is the Fifth Action

IF, therefore, the accused asked to be defended, how can this be admitted when the names of the witnesses are kept altogether secret? It is to be said that three considerations are to be observed in admitting any defence. First, that an Advocate shall be allotted to the accused. Second, that the names of the witnesses shall not be made known to the Advocate, even under an oath of secrecy, but that he shall be informed of everything contained in the depositions. Third, the accused shall as far as possible be given the benefit of every doubt, provided that this involves no scandal to the faith nor is in any way detrimental to justice, as will be shown. And in like manner the prisonerâs procurator shall have full access to the whole process, only the names of the witnesses and deponents being suppressed; and the Advocate can act also in the name of procurator.

As to the first of these points: it should be noted that an Advocate is not to be appointed at the desire of the accused, as if he may choose which Advocate he will have; but the Judge must take great care to appoint neither a litigious nor an evil-minded man, nor yet one who is easily bribed (as many are), but rather an honourable man to whom no sort of suspicion attaches.

And the Judge ought to note four points, and if the Advocate be found to conform to them, he shall be allowed to plead, but not otherwise. For first of all the Advocate must examine the nature of the case, and then if he finds it a just one he may undertake it, but if he finds it unjust he must refuse it; and he must be very careful not to undertake an unjust or desperate case. But if he has unwittingly accepted the brief, together with a fee, from someone who wishes to do him an injury, but discovers during the process that the case is hopeless, then he must signify to his client (that is, the accused) that he abandons the case, and must return the fee which he has received. This is the opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines, which is wholly in conformity with the Canon de jud. i, rem non novam. But Henry of Segusio holds an opposite view concerning the return of the fee in a case in which the Advocate has worked very hard. Consequently if an Advocate has wittingly undertaken to defend a prisoner whom he knows to be guilty, he shall be liable for the costs and expenses (de admin. tut. i, non tamen est ignotum).

The second point to be observed is that in his pleading he should conduct himself properly in three respects. First, his behaviour must be modest and free from prolixity or pretentious oratory. Secondly, he must abide by the truth, not bringing forward any fallacious arguments or reasoning, or calling false witnesses, or introducing legal quirks and quibbles if he be a skilled lawyer, or bringing counter-accusations; especially in cases of this sort, which must be conducted as simply and summarily as possible. Thirdly, his fee must be regulated by the usual practice of the district.

But to return to our point; the Judge must make the above conditions clear to the Advocate, and finally admonish him not to incur the charge of defending heresy, which would make him liable to excommunication.

And it is not a valid argument for him to say to the Judge that he is not defending the error, but the person. For he must not by any means so conduct his defence as to prevent the case from being conducted in a plain and summary manner, and he would be doing so if he introduced any complications or appeals into it; all which things are disallowed together. For it is granted that he does not defend the error; for in that case he would be more damnably guilty than the witches themselves, and rather a heresiarch than a heretical wizard. Nevertheless, if he unduly defends a person already suspect of heresy, he makes himself as it were a patron of that heresy, and lays himself under not only a light but a strong suspicion, in accordance with the manner of his defence; and ought publicly to abjure that heresy before the Bishop.

We have put this matter at some length, and it is not to be neglected by the Judge, because much danger may arise from an improper conducting of the defence by an Advocate or Procurator. Therefore, when there is any objection to the Advocate, the Judge must dispense with him and proceed in accordance with the facts and the proofs. But when the Advocate for the accused is not open to any objection, but is a zealous man and lover of justice, then the Judge may reveal to him the names of the witnesses, under an oath of secrecy.

Question XI. What Course the Advocate should Adopt when the Names of the Witnesses are not Revealed to him. Ths Sixth Action

BUT it may be asked: What, then, should the Advocate acting a Procurator for the accused do, when the names of the witnesses are withheld from both himself and his client, although the accused earnestly desires that they should be made known? We answer that he should obtain information from the Judge on every point of the accusation, which must be given to him at his request, only the names of the witnesses being suppressed; and with this information he should approach the accused and, if the matter involves a very grave charge, exhort him to exercise all the patience which he can.

And if the accused again and again insists that she should know the names of the witnesses against her, he can answer her as follows: You can guess from the charges which are made against you who are the witnesses. For the child or beast of so and so has been bewitched; or to such a woman or man, because they refused to lend you something for which you asked, you said, "You shall know that it would have been better to have agreed to my request," and they bear witness that in consequence of your words the person was suddenly taken ill; and facts are stronger evidence than words. And you know that you have a bad reputation, and have for a long time been suspected of casting spells upon and injuring many men. And talking in this manner, he may finally induce her to enter a plea that they had borne witness against her from motives of hatred; or to say, "I confess that I did say so, but not with any intent to do harm."

Therefore the Advocate must first lay before the Judge and his assessors this plea of personal enmity, and the Judge must inquire into it. And if it should be found to be a case of mortal enmity, as that there has been some attempted or accomplished murder committed by the husbands or kindred of the parties, or that someone of one party has been charged with a crime by someone of the other party, so that he fell into the hands of public justice, or that serious wounds have resulted from quarrels and brawls between them; then the upright and careful Judge will consult with his assessors whether the accused of the deponent was the aggravating party. For if, for example, the husband or friends of the accused have unjustly oppressed the friends of the deponent, then if there is no evidence of the fact that children or animals or men have been bewitched, and if there are no other witnesses, and the accused is not even commonly suspected of witchcraft, in that case it is presumed that the depositions were laid against her from motives of vengeance, and she is to be discharged as innocent and freely dismissed, after having been duly cautioned against seeking to avenge herself, in the manner which is usually used by Judges.

The following case may be put. Katharinaâs child, or she herself, is bewitched, or she has suffered much loss of her cattle; and she suspects the accused because her husband or brothers had previously brought on an unjust accusation against her own husband or brother. Here the cause of enmity is twofold on the part of the deponent, having its root both in her own bewitchment and in the unjust accusation brought against her husband or brother. Then ought her deposition to be rejected or not? From one point of view it seems that it should, because she is actuated by enmity; from another point of view it should not, because there is the evidence of the fact in her bewitchment.

We answer that if in this case there are no other deponents, and the accused is not even under common suspicion, then her depositions cannot be allowed, but must be rejected; but if the accused is rendered suspect, and if the disease is not due to natural causes but to witchcraft (and we shall show later how this can be distinguished), she is to be subjected to a canonical purgation.

If it be asked further whether the other deponents must bear witness to the evidence of the fact as experienced by themselves or others, or only to the public reputation of the accused; we answer that, if they give evidence of the fact, so much the better. But if they only give evidence as to her general character, and the matter stands so, then, although the Judge must reject that deponent on the grounds of personal enmity, yet he shall take the evidence of the fact, and of her bad reputation given by the other witnesses, as proof that the accused must be strongly suspect, and on these grounds he can sentence her to a threefold punishment: namely, to a canonical purgation because of her reputation; or to an abjuration, because of the suspicion under which she rests, and there are various forms of abjuration for various degrees of suspicion, as will be shown in the fourth method of passing sentence; or, because of the evidence of the fact, and if she confesses her crime and is penitent, she shall not be handed over to the secular branch for capital punishment, but be sentenced by the ecclesiastical Judge to imprisonment for life. But notwithstanding the fact that she has been sentenced to imprisonment for life by the ecclesiastical Judge, the secular Judge can, on account of the temporal injuries which she has committed, deliver her to be burned. But all these matters will be made clear later when we deal with the sixth method of passing sentence.

To sum up: Let the Judge first take care not to lend too easy belief to the Advocate when he pleads mortal enmity on behalf of the accused; for in these cases it is very seldom that anyone bears witness without enmity, because witches are always hated by everybody. Secondly, let him take note that there are four ways by which a witch can be convicted, namely, by witnesses, by direct evidence of the fact, and by her own confession. And if she is detained on account of a general report, she can be convicted by the evidence of witnesses; if on account of definite suspicion, the direct or indirect evidence of the facts can convict her, and by reason of these the suspicion may be judged to be either light or strong or grave. All this is when she does not confess; but when she does, the case can proceeds as has been said.

Thirdly, let the Judge make use of all the foregoing circumstances to meet the plea of the Advocate, whether the accused is charged only by reason of a general report, or whether there are also certain evidences to support the charge by which she incurs slight or strong suspicion; and then he will be able to answer the Advocateâs allegation of personal enmity, which is the first line of defence which he may assume.

But when the Advocate assumes the second line of defence, admitting that the accused has used such words against the deponent as, "You shall soon know what is going to happen to you," or "You will wish soon enough that you had lent or sold me what I asked for," or some such words; and submits that, although the deponent afterwards experienced some injury either to this person or his property, yet it does not follow from this that the accused was the cause of it as a witch, for illnesses may be due to various different causes. Also he submits that it is a common habit of women to quarrel together with such words, etc.

The Judge ought to answer such allegations in the following manner. If the illness is due to natural causes, then the excuse is good. But the evidence indicates the contrary; for it cannot be cured by any natural remedy; or in the opinion of the physicians the illness is due to witchcraft, or is what is in common speech called a Night-scathe. Again, perhaps other enchantresses are of the opinion that it is due to witchcraft. Or because it came suddenly, without any previous sickening, whereas natural diseases generally develop gradually. Or perhaps because the plaintiff had found certain instruments of witchcraft under his bed or in his clothes or elsewhere, and when these were removed he was suddenly restored to health, as often happens, as we showed in the Second Part of this work where we treated of remedies. And by some such answer as this the Judge can easily meet this allegation, and show that the illness was due rather to witchcraft than to any natural causes, and that the accused must be suspected of causing such witchcraft, by reason of her threatening words. In the same way, if someone said, "I wish your barn would be burned down," and this should afterwards happen, it would engender a grave suspicion that the person who had used that threat had caused the barn to be set on fire, even if another person, and not he himself, had actually set light to it.

Question XII. Of the Same Matter, Declaring more Particularly how the Question of Personal Enmity is to be Investigated. The Seventh Action

TAKE notice that only mortal enemies are debarred from giving evidence, as was shown in the Fifth Question. But the Judge may consider that to come to a decision about such enmity by the means we have just explained is rather dubious and unsatisfactory; and the accused or her Procurator may not be willing to accept a decision arrived at on such grounds as to whether the enmity is mortal or not. Therefore the Judge must use other means to decide concerning the alleged enmity, so that he may not punish the innocent, but exact full justice from the guilty. And though these means may savour of cunning and even guile, yet the Judge may employ them for the good of the faith and the State; for even S. Paul says: But being crafty, I caught you by guile. And these means are especially to be employed in the case of a prisoner who has not been publically defamed, and is not suspected because of the evidence of any fact; and the Judge may also employ them against prisoners who have alleged enmity on the part of the deponents, and wish to know all the names of the witnesses.

The first method is this. The accused or her Advocate is given a copy of the process with the names of the deponents or informers, but not in the order in which they deposed; but in such a way that the name of the witness who comes first in the copy is sixth or seventh in the schedule, and he who comes second is last or last but one. In this way the accused will be deceived as to which witness deposed this or that. And then she will either say that they are all her enemies, or not; and if she says that they all are, she will be more easily detected in a lie when the cause of the enmity is investigated by the Judge; and if she names only certain ones, still the cause of the enmity will be more easily investigated.

The second method is similar, when the Advocate is given a copy of the process, and separately a list of the names of the deponents; but there are added other matters perpetrated elsewhere by witches, but not set down in writing by the witnesses or deponents. And so the accused will not be able to say definitely that this one or that one is her mortal enemy, because she does not know what they have deposed against her.

The third method was touched upon in the Fifth Question above. For when the accused is questioned at the end of her second examination, and before she has demanded to be defended or an Advocate has been allotted to her, let her be asked whether she thinks that she has any mortal enemies who, setting aside all fear of God, would falsely accuse her of the crime of heresy and witchcraft. And then perhaps without thinking, and not having seen the depositions of the witnesses, she will answer that she does not think that she has any such enemies. Or if she says, "I think I have," and names any of the witnesses who have laid information, and the reason for that enmity is known, then the Judge will be able to investigate it with more certainty afterwards, when the accused has been given separate copies of the process and of the names of the witnesses, in the manner we have explained.

The fourth method is this. At the end of her second examination and confession (as we showed in the Sixth Question), before she is granted any means of defence, let her be questioned as to the witnesses who have laid the more serious charges against her, in this manner. "Do you know So-and-so?• naming one of the witnesses; and then she will answer either Yes or No. If she says No, she will not be able, after she has been given means of defence and an Advocate, to plead that he is a mortal enemy, since she has said on oath that she does not know him. But if she says Yes, let her be asked whether she knows or has heard that he or she has acted in any way contrary to the Christian faith in the manner of a witch. Then if she says Yes, for he did such and such a thing; let her be asked whether he is her friend or enemy; and she will immediately answer that he is her friend, because of the testimony of such is not of very great account; and consequently she will not be able afterwards to plead an oath through her Advocate that he is her enemy, for she has already said that he is her friend. But if she answers that she knows nothing about him, let her again be asked whether he is her friend or enemy, and she will at once answer that he is her friend; for it would be futile to allege enmity on the part of someone of whom she knows nothing. Therefore she says, "I am his friend, but if I knew anything about him I would not fail to reveal it." Therefore she will not be able afterwards to plead that her is her enemy. Or perhaps she will from the very beginning allege reasons for mortal enmity, and in that case some credence must be placed in the plea of the Advocate.

A fifth method is to give the Advocate or the accused a copy of the process, with the names of the informers suppressed. And then the accused will guess, and very often rightly, who has deposed such and such against her. And then if she says, "So-and-so is my mortal enemy, and I am willing to prove it by witnesses," then the Judge must consider whether the person named is the same person named in the schedule, and since she has said that she is willing to prove it by witnesses, he will examine those witnesses and inquire into the causes of the enmity, having secretly called into consultation learned and aged men of known prudence. And if he finds sufficient reasons for mortal enmity, he shall reject that evidence and dismiss the prisoner, unless there are other grave charges against her, sworn to by other witnesses.

And this fifth method is commonly used; and it is found in practice that witches quickly guess from the copy of the process who has laid information against them. And because in such cases mortal enmity is rarely found unless it arises from the wicked deeds of the witch, therefore the Judge can easily come to a decision by the above means. Also it is to be noted that often the informers desire to confront the witch personally, and to charge her to her face with the bewitchment which has befallen them.

There is still one more method whereunto the Judge may finally have recourse, when perhaps the other methods, and especially the first four, seem to some to savour too much of cunning and deceit. Accordingly, to satisfy and content the scrupulous, and that no fault may be found with the Judge, let him take care, after he has found by the above methods that there is no mortal enmity between the accused and the deponent, but wishes to remove all grounds for complaint by settling the question finally in consultation with his other assessors, to act as follows. Let him give to the accused or her Advocate a copy of the process, with the names of the deponents or informers suppressed. And since her defence is that she has mortal enemies, and perhaps she has alleged various reasons for the enmity, whether or not the facts are in agreement with her statements, let the Judge call into consultation learned men of every faculty (if such can be had), or at least some honest and reputable persons (for this is the purport of that statute we have so often quoted); and let him cause the whole process to be read through to them from end to end by the Notary or scribe, and let the names of the witnesses be made known to them, but under an oath of secrecy; and he shall first inquire whether or not they are willing to be bound by such an oath, for if not the names must by no means be declared to them.

Then let him tell how he has inquired in such and such a manner into the alleged enmity, and has not been able to find any testimony of fact. But he shall add that, if they please, one of two courses shall be pursued. Either they shall decide then and there in consultation whether the evidence of any of the witnesses shall be rejected on the grounds of mortal personal enmity; or let them choose three or four or five persons who have most knowledge in that town or village of any friendship or enmity between the accused and the informer, who are not present at the consultation, and let them be informed of the names only of the accused and the witness, but not of the information which has been deposed, and let the whole question be left to their judgement. If they follow the former of these courses, they cannot very well reject any witness, since the Judge has already used his own methods of investigation; but by the second course he protects himself perfectly, and clears himself of all ugly suspicions. And he ought to observe this last method when the accused has been taken in a foreign town or country. These methods will suffice for examining the question of personal enmity.

Question XIII. Of the Points to be Observed by the Judge before the Formal Examination in the Place of Detention and Torture. This is the Eighth Action

THE next action of the Judge is quite clear. For common justice demands that a witch should not be condemned to death unless she is convicted by her own confession. But here we are considering the case of one who is judged to be taken in manifest heresy for one of the other two reasons set down in the First Question, namely, direct or indirect evidence of the fact, or the legitimate production of witnesses; and in this case she is to be exposed to questions and torture to extort a confession of her crimes.

And to make the matter clear we will quote a case which occurred at Spires and came to the knowledge of many. A certain honest man was bargaining with a woman, and would not come to terms with her about the price of some article; so she angrily called after him, "You will soon wish you had agreed." For witches generally use this manner of speaking, or something like it, when they wish to bewitch a person by looking at him. Then he, not unreasonably being angry with her, looked over his shoulder to see with what intention she had uttered those words; and behold! he was suddenly bewitched so that his mouth was stretched sideways as far as his ears in a horrible deformity, and he could not draw it back, but remained so deformed for a long time.

We put this case that this was submitted to the Judge as direct evidence of the fact; and it is asked whether the woman is to be considered as manifestly taken in the heresy of witchcraft. This should be answered from the words of S. Bernard which we have quoted above. For there are three ways in which a person may be judged to be so taken, and they not so closely conjoined as though it were necessary for all three to agree in one conclusion, but each one by itself, namely, the evidence of the fact, or the legitimate production of witnesses, or her own confession, is sufficient to prove a witch to be manifestly taken in that heresy.

But indirect evidence of the fact is different from direct evidence; yet thought it is not so conclusive, it is still taken from the words and deeds of witches, as was shown in the Seventh Question, and it is judged from witchcraft which is not so immediate in its effect, but follows after some lapse of time from the utterance of the threatening words. Wherefore may we conclude that this is the case with such witches who have been accused and have not made good their defence (or have failed to defend themselves because this privilege was not granted them; and it was not granted because they did not ask for it). But what we are to consider now is what action the Judge should take, and how he should proceed to question the accused with a view to extorting the truth from her so that sentence of death may finally be passed upon her.

And here, because of the great trouble caused by the stubborn silence of witches, there are several points which the Judge must notice, and these are dealt with under their several heads.

And the first is that he must not be too quick to subject a witch to examination, but must pay attention to certain signs which will follow. And he must not be too quick for this reason: unless God, through a holy Angel, compels the devil to withhold his help from the witch, she will be so insensible to the pains of torture that she will sooner be torn limb from limb than confess any of the truth.

But the torture is not to be neglected for this reason, for they are not all equally endowed with this power, and also the devil sometimes of his own will permits them to confess their crimes without being compelled by a holy Angel. And for the understanding of this the reader is referred to that which is written in the Second Part of this work concerning the homage which they offer to the devil.

For there are some who obtain from the devil a respite of six or eight or ten years before they have to offer him their homage, that is, devote themselves to him body and soul; whereas others, when they first profess their abjuration of the faith, at the same time offer their homage. And the reason why the devil allows that stipulated interval of time is that, during that time, he may find out whether the witch has denied the faith with her lips only but not in her heart, and would therefore offer him her homage in the same way.

For the devil cannot know the inner thoughts of the heart except conjecturally from outward indications, as we showed in the First Part of this work where we dealt with the question whether devils can turn the minds of men to hatred or love. And many have been found who, driven by some necessity or poverty, have been induced by other witches, in the hope of ultimate forgiveness in confession, to become either total or partial apostates from the faith. And it is such whom the devil deserts without any compulsion by a holy Angel; and therefore they readily confess their crimes, whereas others, who have from their hearts bound themselves to the devil, are protected by his power and preserve a stubborn silence.

And this provides a clear answer to the question how it comes about that some witches readily confess, and others will by no means do so. For in the case of the former, when the devil is not compelled by God, he still deserts them of his own will, in order that by temporal unhappiness and a horrible death he may lead to despair those over whose hearts he could never obtain the mastery. For it is evident from their sacramental confessions that they have never voluntarily obeyed the devil, but have been compelled by him to work witchcraft.

And some also are distinguished by the fact that, after they have admitted their crimes, they try to commit suicide by strangling or hanging themselves. And they are induced to do this by the Enemy, lest they should obtain pardon from God through sacramental confession. This chiefly happens in the case of those who have not been willing agents of the devil; although it may also happen in the case of willing agents, after they have confessed their crimes: but then it is because the devil has been compelled to desert the witch.

In conclusion we may say that it is as difficult, or more difficult, to compel a witch to tell the truth as it is to exorcise a person possessed of the devil. Therefore the Judge ought not to be too willing or ready to proceed to such examination, unless, as has been said, the death penalty is involved. And in this case he must exercise great care, as we shall show; and first we shall speak of the method of sentencing a witch to such torture.